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plan! scientific criteria 1r the our posi tions and join those llh 
is-time death and accept<• ·e for- whom we are in fundamental 
mat: for dealing with [ ctors, 
donl'• s, and rec ipients m trans-
plantations. 
T he major concern of Medico/ 
Moral Commitees is moral ity-
truth-protection of innocent life-
concern for society's most he lpless 
beings- the unborn , the deformed 
-the aged. Legal questions need 
to be faced , but legality should 
not dictate morality. It is our posi-
tion-not without competent legal 
backing- that the more firmly our 
Catholic position and integrity a re 
reaffirmed, the stronger our case 
in court. In recent personnal corre· 
spondence with Andre Hellegers , 
he felt that Medico/ Moral Commit· 
tees can help resolve tough cases 
within the directives but not with· 
in the civil legal system. "Ulti-
mately you would be asked how you 
picked the jury." 
Age of Ecumenism 
Our ·hospitals have been first in 
establishing departments of pastor-
al care to bring in- as official, part· 
time chaplains - ministers and rab-
bis of the community to minister 
to their own parishioners. The 
Catholic hospital respects the con-
science of every one. 
Plurali.sm is a two-way street. As 
others who disagree with us go their 
way freely, we expect and demand 
the right to go ours. 
So frequently , Pluralism is spok· 
en to imply that we should abandon 
134 
agreement. 
This is not logical. This is 101 
Democratic. However, let it !Ol 
be said of us that we dq not re~ x t 
the conscience of othe rs. ·w t lo. 
That is why we promote De trt· 
ments of Pastoral Care and ( 1er 
interfaith programs. We re· ect 
the inviolability of the c onsc 1ce 
of others. We demand the me 
freedom for our consc ience. 
Every hospital has a consctt 
A hospital· is not simply p( 
cement and automated equipr 
The conscience resides in the 
soring group and Board of I 
tors. As they are legally respor 
fo r the quality of care and thL 
tection of standards in the ho' 
we believe that they a re lik 
responsible for the ethics and 
tone of the services provided 
Conclusion 
ce. 
red 
·nt. 
on· 
·ec· 
tble 
>ro-
t tal, 
vise 
1ral 
Yes, we .are ·in a battle, rr rs a 
new ball game, but we are in here 
fighting, confident and ho .eful. 
We are restricted in many \\ ys-
but especially by our own ca u ous· 
ness and fear of taking hard !. tnds. 
If the Catholic Hospital va1 tshes 
from the American scene because 
of total secularization, it '"' II be 
an irreparable loss. Despite the· 
doom sayers from within and with· 
out the Church, we are indeed 
Catholic and society needs Catho-
lic hospitals. We will not aba ndon 
the challenge! 
Linacre Quarterly 
BOOK REVIEW 
Death By Choice 
by Daniel C. Maguire 
Reviewed by William E. May 
At the outset it is necessary to 
say that several features of this 
work disturb me greatly. and I hope 
to show why in -some detail later. 
Despite these troubling qualities, 
and they are critically significant , 
the work and the argument that it 
advances merit wide readership and 
thoughtful respo nse , particularly 
by physicians, nurses, priests and 
others charged with caring for the 
dying; to its author we owe grati-
tude for exploring so se nsitively a 
question of tremendous urgency. 
The central question Maquire 
raises is this: "can it be moral and 
should it be legal to take direct 
action to terminate life in certain 
circumstances?" His answer is · yes, 
and the major part of the work is 
devoted to showing why he believes 
that this is morally right, altho ugh 
he is also concerned to have this 
moral right legaiJy recognized. 
Before tackling the moral issue, 
h~wever, Maguire first shows why 
thiS question is of such urgency . 
tOday. We live in a world where the 
tremendous advances in medical 
SCience have made it very difficult 
to die, in a world where it makes 
sense to ask whether the medical 
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"treatment" being given some pa-
tients is really helping to preserve 
the ir lives or whether it is simply 
prolonging their death. At present 
people c an be kept alive inde finite-
ly in a comatose state, a nd there 
have been instances when a utopsies 
perfo rmed on individual s main-
tained in existence for years have 
shown that their brains had already 
liquefied. We live, too, in a world 
where the law has failed to keep 
pace with medical realities and 
where juries at times have had to 
find persons innocent of "murder-
ous" crimes by reason of insanity 
whe n these persons were neithe r 
insane nor morally guilty of murder 
-and juries have had to do this to 
"get around the law." Finally, we · 
live in a world where the moral 
certitudes of another day have been' 
questioned, and seriously so, by 
thinking persons, including Catho-
lic moral theologians and even one 
bishop, Bishop Simons of India. All 
this Maquire relates, and brilliant· 
ly, in the first part of the book. 
In the second part of his study 
Maquire first provides a methodol-
ogy for "doing" ethics. He is con-
cerned principally with discovering 
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the \ .y to describe our n 'ral ac-
tion~ ruthfully. This, afte a ll , is 
wha --thics in a normative •nse is 
all aoout: it is an attempt o find 
out the moral meaning or human 
significance of our deeds. And this 
is a meaning that we do not give to 
our actions, but it is one that they 
have, whether we want them to 
have it or not, and that we ought to 
be able to discover. We discover 
that meaning by raising questions 
(who, what, where, when, how, why, 
with what results, a re any alterna-
tives available). In showing the rele-
vance of these questions in deter-
mining the meaning of o ur actions 
Maquire is perhaps at his best, a l-
though one of my objections to the 
position that he ultimately develo ps 
is that I do not believe that he takes 
seriously enough some of the an-
swers that may be given to these 
questions. There are, furthermore, 
o ther questions tha t can be raised. 
For instance, what moral identity 
is a person tak iQg o n himself in 
doing ~his deed? We shall return to 
this subsequently. 
In describing ethics as an activity 
carried on by intelligent men that 
consists in the raising of relevant 
questions Maquire is right on target. 
That is why ethics consists in large 
measure in listening, in listening to 
reality and to people, above all 
people who do some thinking, peo-
ple like Maquire. In this section of 
his book Maquire also comments on 
the role of principles, feelings (what 
he calls Gemiit), group experience, 
ra tio nal analysis, and c reative imag-
ination in e thics. His observations 
here are very much worth noting, 
in pa rticular his reflections on the 
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role of creative imagination ir· de-
vising viable a lternatives to the 
terrible dilemmas that confror us 
in our struggle to make sens of 
our lives. Nonetheless, his di· us-
sion of principles in ethics is · i1 my 
judgment very inade-quate, f he 
makes no distinction whatsc ver 
between a moral -principle a I a 
moral rule . This is a matter of on· 
siderable importance, but sin ~ it 
is not of immediate concern t1 the 
argument that he advances th t e is 
no urgency to comment on this 
here. Still it is a matter of con ~rn , 
particularly for a brother ett .:ist. 
After discussing in general that 
it means to do ethics Maquir ad· 
dresses fo ur questio_ns of sr c ial 
relevance in any attempt to g t to 
the true meaning of activitie~ that 
may terminate life in a medica! .::on· 
text. These deal with the diffe• ·nee 
between o mission and commi ion, 
the directly and indirectly inte1 Jed. 
the use of ordinary and of t '<t ra· 
o rdinary means, a nd the meant tg of 
proportionidity. These questior s are 
of urgency for various rea.;ons. 
Some writers (e.g., Joseph Fletcher) 
say that it ma kes no moral dtffer· 
ence whatsoever whether 'one kills a 
person directly by an act of com· 
mission o r "kills" him indirectly 
by an act of o mission (by refusing 
to use some m edical device that 
could prolo ng life - o r prolong the 
dying process? - or by ceasing to 
use it once it has been begun). 
Maquire argues, and rightly so. that 
the distinctions between omitting 
a n action a nd committing an act ion, 
between killing a person direcdy 
a nd allowing him to die his own 
death and thus "killing" him in-
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directly by refusing to use extra-
ordinary means are valid and of 
critical moral importance. They are 
valid because they refer to diffe ring 
moral realities; there are differing 
truth-making factors involved. So 
far, so good. 
The trouble begins, I think, when 
Maguire starts to analyze more 
closely the diffe rence between the 
"indirectly" and the "directly" 
intended and the role tha t the prin-
ciple of proportionate reason plays 
in giving us clues to the true sig-
nificance or meaning of our mora l 
deeds. Maguire, while recognizing 
the· validity of the distinction be-
tween the direc tly and the indirect-
ly intended, becomes worried about 
its applicability and begins to place 
too much stress on the role of the 
proportionate good. There are 
many reasons why this can happen, 
and some are spelled o ut in his 
text. For one thing, Catholic moral-
ists in the past went thro ugh con-
siderable mental gymnastics over 
the directly and the indirectly in-
tended (that is, doing deeds that 
directly accomplish good while in-
directly accomplishing evil), and 
Maguire does a maste rful job of 
showing what these gymnastics were 
and the absurdities to which they 
led: justifying some ho rribly un-
justifiable deeds·carried out in the 
Dame of the "just war," and damn-
ing some deeds that really are justi-
fiable, such as aborting a fetus 
Yihen this is the only available al· · 
ternative for saving the life of the 
Dlotber, while offering inane advice 
about baptizing twoheaded fetuses. 
For another, there is discernible in 
contemporary Cath o lic moral 
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thought a , ust, crystallized in the 
position c' lo ped by the man who 
is perhar he o utstanding moral 
theologia tn this country, Richard 
McCorm; t., to believe that one 
can rightl; hoth directly intend and 
effect evil provided there is a value 
or good of such importance that 
its realization can justify the doing 
of the deadly deed a nd even direct-
ly intending it in itself but not fo r 
itse lf (as McCorm ick puts it: direct-
ly intending and effecting evil in se 
sed non propter se). In other words , 
the argument, as Maguire advances 
it, is that a sufficient proportionate 
good (for instance, human dignity 
and freedom) can serve to justify 
the doing of the deadly deed under 
cer tain circumstances. 
T hat this in fact is what Maguire 
himself believes is amply demon-
strated in a chapter where he ap-
plies this way of thinking to such 
topics as abortion (justifiable, as 
as act directly terminative of the 
life of the fetus and intended as 
such, under certain kinds of con-
ditions, largely dependent on the 
age of the fetus), capital punishment 
(not justifiable, because a sufficient 
proportionate good is not at stake 
a nd other alternatives are avail- · 
able), war (yes, to an extent, al-
though there are inherent limita-
tions because of the possible dis-
proportionate use of force), and 
suicide (yes, under certain kinds of 
specifiable con ditions), and , of 
course, death by choice in medical 
situations. 
My problem basically is that I 
think Maguire's approach opens the 
way to certain kinds of killing that 
a re not truthfully justifiable, and it 
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oper the way toward tJ -;e be-
c au<; t puts too much W t ht on 
the nciple of pro portion, ty. In 
man' of the cases tha t he dt t r ibes 
it is, I believe, mo rally rr ht to 
take actions that a re, as p11vsical 
activities, "directly" destructive of 
life, but in these instances, I wo uld 
argue, the moral activity in q ues-
tion is not properly, that is truth-
fully, describable as an act of killing. 
They are not acts o f killing because 
there is not only a proportionate 
reason for engaging in them (the 
protection of a truly human good 
that is imperilled, such as freedom 
and dignity) but also in them the 
intent of the agent and the thrust or 
directionality o f his action is not 
necessarily against the life of a hu-
man being, eve n tho ugh it is fore-
seen that some one is going to die 
as a result of the act in question. 
They are actions, in othe r words, 
in v..:-_ich the doer will not take on 
as part of h is moral identity the 
identity of a killer because they 
are nol truthfully acts of killing. 
This is the reason why I believe 
that it is pertine nt to ask, what is 
the moral identity that a person is 
taking on, and taking on unavo id-
ably, in and through his deeds. If 
. someone does something that re-
sults in death and, in doing this, 
does not necessarily take on the 
identity of a killer , one of the 
reasons why this is so is that the 
ac t in question is not properly, that 
is truthfully or morally, an act of 
killing. 
I can clarify what I mean by 
taking some examples that Maguire 
uses. Those Eskimos who used to 
go. off on an ice floe to die so that 
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they would no longer burdel" he 
community were · not commi ng 
suicide, although this is the 1ay 
that Maguire would describe e ir 
deed. I submit that they wen tot 
setting out to e nd their live to· 
choose death. They realfze t of' 
course, that they were going t< lie. 
But they were not intending t do 
this directly. Nor was thei • act 
directly terminative of their ·es. 
It was directed toward somt ing 
e lse - namely the ir removal om 
the community and its res< ces 
in food and shelter and so •th, 
and the well being of the tire 
community. They sacrificed 1eir 
lives for the good of others an 
act that indeed involved 'tei r 
death but was itself not th ,ted 
upon their death. For an imJ •tial 
observer to jump upon then and 
cry "stop killing yourselves" mid 
be as ludicrous as it would b<" or a 
witness to a surgical operat1 1 to 
rush into the operating roor and 
cry "stop r:nutiiating that p son, 
doctor." Similarly some a ions 
that a perso n may take to stc ) the 
insufferable pain that a dyin per· 
son may be e xperienc ing (Ra· sey's 
second qualification , be it oted, 
in his sensitively written a t lysis 
of our duty to care and (or yl to 
care for the d ying) may be do ectly 
causative of death in the ph\sical 
sense but not be directly ca Jsitive 
in a mora l sense. Their doers are 
not taking o n the identity of killers, 
and they are not doing so precisely 
because the d eed they do is not to 
be described truthfully as an act of 
killing. 
What is the importance of this? 
It is this. Many of the deeds that 
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Maguire justifies in his discussion 
are, in my judgment, tru thfully to 
be described as acts of ki lling , be-
cause in them the doer canno t not 
intend the death o f anothe r human 
being (e.g. , certain kinds of abor-
tion that Maguire justifies, and cer-
tain kinds of suicide) . For him 
these are justifiable only in terms 
of a proportionate good. a princ i-
ple that he te rms the "master rubric 
in ethics." For me, the princ iple 
of proportio nality is a necessary but 
not sufficient c riterion; it need s to 
be complemented by the princ iple 
of the directly vs. the indirectly 
intended, in the sense that both 
the intent of the agent and the in-
tent or thrust of the action is d ir-
ectly targeted on a good and o nly 
indirectly o n an evil - and this 
principle , inturn, must be com ple-
mented by the principle of propor-
tionality. 
Maguire, I be lieve, may have let 
his rhetoric carry him away. He 
frequently speaks o f death as a 
friend. Death, I submit , is not a 
friend. To call death a friend is to 
use a perso nification, an anthropo-
morphism. Death, as a reality, is an 
evil. It is not the greatest evil , to 
be sure, but it is still an evil , for it is 
the deprivatio n o f a real good, the 
good of life, and the only life that 
we know of immediately and direct-
ly. Life too is a real good, and must 
be recognized and respected as 
such, even though it is no t the ab-
solute or greatest good , the sum-
mum bonum (an e rror that those 
rnake who would insist that we keep 
~n doi~g everything to preserve 
ife unttl the matter is completely 
beyond our control). What is a 
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friend is e person who will d o a 
deed th, may indeed bring on 
death (a ·ven directly, in a physi-
cal sensl hu t will at the same time 
respect tl;c life and dignity of a h u-
man bemg. 
Some readers may suspect tha t 
my objections to Maguire's posi-
tion (since it is one with whic h I 
am. in many ways, in substantial 
agreement) a re merely matters o f 
semantics a nd quibbling. Some may 
think tha t I a m engaging in the me n-
tal gym nastics tha t typified som e 
of the manualists of a bygone day. 
Yet there is, I submit, something 
of crucial significance at stake . T o 
me Maguire's position opens the 
way to killings that really are kill-
ings, to deed s the doing of whic h 
would inevi tably mean that the ir 
doer were taking on , as part of his 
moral identity, the identity o f a 
killer. I've tried to show why in 
as short a space as possible. For 
readers serio usly inte rested in the 
question I would suggest that they 
read carefully two of Maguire's 
favorite authors: Thomas Aquinas 
and J. G le nn Gray. T he article in 
Summa Theologiae 11-11 , 64, 7, o n 
ki lling in self-defense and the dif-
ference Gray sees in those combat 
soldiers who became kille rs and 
those who did not, although bo th 
engaged in acts that killed people, 
may help illumine my problem with 
Maguire. I a lso suggest that they 
read an autho r who is obviously no t 
one of Mag uire's favorites, s ince 
he is nowhere ci ted in the work, al-
though he has written, and sensi-
tively so, o n the critical issues a t 
stake, Germ a in Grisez, particularly 
his study o f abortion . 
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Da iel Maguire has gi\ n us a 
very .:nsitive and thoughtf, 1 book. 
He , ~ al izes that good ett. ·s de-
pen <.. on good argument!>. I be-
lieve that be has given us, n this 
study, many excellent argumt> nts (I 
have not even noted some of his 
wonderful ideas about handling the 
issue of who should decide in issues 
of life and death). Nonetheless, I 
think that in many ways he 
failed to think deeply enough < 
the issue, and particularly the 
vance of the distinction bet 
the indirectly and the direct! 
tended for the problem at the 
of his book. 
William E. May 
Professor of Christian Et~ 
Catholic University of An 
ANNOUNCEMENT 
The Mendel Club of Boston College and the Guild of 
St. Luke of Boston presented a lecture April 26 to 
observe the establishment of a library on medical 
ethics at Boston College. The speaker was William J . 
Harrington . M.D., a Boston College alumnus. former 
member of the Boston guild and chairman of the De-
partment of Medicine at Miami University School of 
Medicine. His topic was "Human Experimentation." 
Financed by the guild and housed at Boston College, 
the new library will serve as an important resource 
function for those interested in the burgeoning fiel d 
of medical ethics. 
as 
•Ut 
le-
en 
in-
art 
·ica 
140 Linacre Q uarterly 
Death by Choice: A Rejoinder 
Daniel C. Maguire 
What is most -noteworthy in W il-
liam E . May's reaction to my book 
is his agreement with me. The main 
burden of my book is to argue that 
we have overestimated our moral 
dominion over death in certain 
cases such as war and capital pun-
ishment and underestimated it in 
matters commonly referred to as 
mercy killing or euthanasia. May 
says that be is " in many ways, in 
substantial agreement," and that 
is true. For example, May allows 
that in certain cases where a dying 
person has insufferable pain, physi-
cally direct action to terminate life 
may be moral. The person who 
brings on death "even directly, in 
a physical sense" may be a friend. 
Do not miss what is being said 
here. Physically direct action may 
mean such things as bubbles of air , 
injections of potassium chloride , or 
morphine, etc. May, while not enu-
merating the possible means sup-
P<>rts the position that life may be 
terminated not just by omission of 
extraordinary means, but by com-
mission and direct action. T his im-
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pressive fact should not be lost in 
the methodological and semantic 
debate of May's critique, because 
it is illustrative of where the argu-
ment is today. I predict that it will 
become increasingly c lear that 
Catholic and other moralists will 
continue to shift from an absolute 
negative on death by choice in a, 
medical context. This shift from 
taboo to nuance is not without dan-
ger. The collapse of taboo is always 
perilous. But the simplism of taboo 
is not ethics, and it is only ethics, 
which makes distinctions where are 
differences, that is worthy of the 
human spirit. We have no choic~ 
but to pay the high price of moral 
freedom and assume the ethical 
task of determining when we have 
the moral right to induce death and 
when we do not. 
May offers criticism of my use of 
the traditional category "direct/ in-
direct." In the language of one of 
the older manuals of moral theol-
ogy, the direct/ indirect distinction 
is explained like this: 
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